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1. INTRODUCTION
The “transaction cost” theory of the firm introduced by Coase (1937) has become
a standard framework for the study of institutional arrangements. The Coasian
framework helps explain not only the existence of the firm, but also its size and
scope. Why, in Coase’s (1937, pp. 393–94) words, “does the entrepreneur not
organize one less transaction or one more?” Some firms are highly integrated:
IBM, for example, produces many of its components and software and maintains
its own sales force for mainframe computers. Others are much more specialized:
Dell Computer outsources virtually all its hardware and software components,
selling directly to end users through its catalog and website, while the shoe
company Reebok owns no manufacturing plants, relying on outside suppliers to
make its products. U.S. manufacturing and service companies are increasingly
contracting with specialized information technology firms for their computing
and data warehousing needs, spending $7.2 billion on outsourced computer
operations in 1990. Standard and Poor’s estimates total worldwide outsourcing
for 2003 at $170 billion.1
Why do some firms choose a vertically integrated structure, while others
specialize in one stage of production and outsource the remaining stages to
other firms? In other words, should a firm make its own inputs, should it buy
them on the spot market, or should it maintain an ongoing relationship with
a particular supplier? Traditionally, economists viewed vertical integration or
vertical control as an attempt to earn monopoly rents by gaining control of
input markets or distribution channels. The transaction cost approach, by con-
trast, emphasizes that vertical coordination can be an efficient means of pro-
tecting relationship-specific investments or mitigating other potential conflicts
under incomplete contracting. As transaction cost economics was developed
in the 1970s and 1980s, a stream of empirical literature emerged explaining
the “make-or-buy decision” using transaction cost reasoning. (The traditional
approach has generated relatively few empirical applications beyond analy-
ses of particular antitrust cases.) This chapter surveys the empirical literature
1 These and other examples are provided by Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman (2004, p. 515).
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on vertical boundaries, focusing on the transaction cost approach and em-
phasizing the most important results, while highlighting the challenges that
remain.2
2. THE THEORY OF VERTICAL BOUNDARIES
Coase was the first to explain that the boundaries of the organization depend not
only on the productive technology, but also on the costs of transacting business.
In the Coasian framework, the decision to organize transactions within the firm
as opposed to on the open market—the “make or buy decision”—depends on
the relative costs of internal versus external exchange. The market mechanism
entails certain costs: discovering the relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing
contracts, and so on. Within the firm, the entrepreneur may be able to reduce
these “transaction costs” by coordinating these activities himself. However, in-
ternal organization brings other kinds of transaction costs, namely problems
of information flow, incentives, monitoring, and performance evaluation. The
boundary of the firm, then, is determined by the tradeoff, at the margin, be-
tween the relative transaction costs of external and internal exchange. In this
sense, firm boundaries depend not only on technology, but also on organiza-
tional considerations; that is, on the costs and benefits of various contracting
alternatives.
This is explained in detail in Paul Joskow’s chapter in this volume. A few
highlights are worth mentioning here to guide the reader through the empiri-
cal literature. First, economic organization, both internal and external, imposes
costs because complex contracts are usually incomplete—they provide reme-
dies for only some possible future contingencies. This obviously applies to
written contracts for all but the simplest forms of trade. It also applies to re-
lational contracts, agreements that describe shared goals and a set of general
principles that govern the relationship (Goldberg, 1980; Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy, 2001), and to implicit contracts, agreements that while unstated, are
assumed to be understood by all sides. Second, contractual incompleteness ex-
poses the contracting parties to certain risks. Primarily, if circumstances change
unexpectedly, the original governing agreement may no longer be effective. The
need to adapt to unforeseen contingencies constitutes an additional cost of con-
tracting; failure to adapt imposes what Williamson (1991a) calls “maladaptation
costs.”
The most-often-discussed example of maladaptation is the “holdup” problem
associated with relationship-specific investments.3 The holdup problem figures
2 Earlier surveys of this literature, from a variety of perspectives, include Joskow (1988a), Shelanski
and Klein (1995), Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), Masten and Saussier (2000), Vannoni (2002), Boerner
and Macher (2002), and David and Han (2004). Masten (1996) collects many of the important earlier
articles.
3 More generally, contractual difficulties can arise from several sources: “(1) bilateral dependence;
(2) weak property rights; (3) measurement difficulties and/or oversearching; (4) intertemporal issues that
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prominently Williamson’s (1975, 1985, 1996b), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian’s
(1978), and Grossman and Hart’s (1986) interpretations of the transaction cost
theory. Investment in such assets exposes agents to a potential hazard: If circum-
stances change, their trading partners may try to expropriate the rents accruing
to the specific assets. Rents can be safeguarded through vertical integration,
where a merger eliminates any adversarial interests. Less extreme options in-
clude long-term contracts, partial ownership, or agreements for both parties
to invest in offsetting relationship-specific investments. Overall, several gover-
nance structures may be employed. According to transaction cost theory, parties
tend to choose the governance structure that best controls the underinvestment
problem, given the particulars of the relationship.
In this sense, transaction cost economics may be considered the study of
alternative institutions of governance. Its working hypothesis, as expressed by
Williamson (1991b, p. 79), is that economic organization is mainly an effort to
“align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures,
which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, trans-
action cost economizing) way.” Simply put, the contractual approach tries to
explain how trading partners choose, from the set of feasible institutional alter-
natives, the arrangement that best mitigates the relevant contractual hazards at
least cost.
The theory is fleshed out by specifying which governance structures go with
which transactions. Transactions differ in the degree to which relationship-
specific assets are involved, the amount of uncertainty about the future and
about other parties’ actions, the frequency with which the transaction occurs,
and so on. Each matters for the preferred institution of governance, although
the first—asset specificity—is particularly important. Williamson (1985, p. 55)
defines asset specificity as “durable investments that are undertaken in sup-
port of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is
much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the origi-
nal transaction be prematurely terminated.”4 This could describe a variety of
relationship-specific investments, including both specialized physical and hu-
man capital, along with intangibles such as R&D and firm-specific knowledge or
capabilities.
Governance structures include markets, hierarchies, and hybrids. The pure
anonymous spot market suffices for simple transactions such as basic com-
modity sales. Market prices provide powerful incentives for exploiting profit
can take the form of disequilibrium contracting, real time responsiveness, long latency and strategic abuse;
and (5) weaknesses in the institutional environment” (Williamson, 1996b, p. 14). Each of these has the
potential to impose maladaptation costs. Foreseeing this possibility, agents seek to reduce the potential
costs of maladaptation by matching the appropriate governance structure with the particular characteristics
of the transaction.
4 Klein, Crawford, and Alchian’s (1978) definition is similar, though they omit the qualifier “much.”
Essentially they define a relationship-specific asset (“specialized asset”) as any asset that generates
appropriable quasi-rents; i.e., any asset whose value to its current renter exceeds its value to another
renter.
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opportunities and market participants are quick to adapt to changing circum-
stances as information is revealed through prices. When relationship-specific
assets are at stake, however and when product or input markets are thin, bi-
lateral coordination of investment decisions may be desirable and combined
ownership of these assets may be efficient. Ownership is completely combined
in the fully integrated firm. The transaction cost approach maintains that such hi-
erarchies offer greater protection for specific investments and provide relatively
efficient mechanisms for responding to change where coordinated adaptation is
necessary. Compared with decentralized structures, however, hierarchies pro-
vide managers with weaker incentives to maximize profits and normally incur
additional bureaucratic costs.
Alternatively, partial alignment may be achieved within an intermediate or
hybrid form such as long-term contracts, partial ownership agreements, fran-
chises, networks, alliances, and firms with highly decentralized assignments
of decision rights. Hybrids attempt to achieve some level of central coordina-
tion and protection for specific investments while retaining the high-powered
incentives of market relations.
3. STRATEGIES FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Most of the empirical work on the make-or-buy decision adopts the transaction
cost framework and follows the same basic model. The efficient form of or-
ganization for a given economic relationship—and, therefore, the likelihood of
observing a particular organizational form or governance structure—is seen as a
function of certain properties of the underlying transaction or transactions: asset
specificity, uncertainty, frequency, and so on. Organizational form is the depen-
dent variable, while asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, and frequency are
independent variables. Specifically, the probability of observing a more inte-
grated governance structure depends positively on the amount or value of the
relationship-specific assets involved and, for significant levels of asset speci-
ficity, on the degree of uncertainty about the future of the relationship, on the
complexity of the transaction, on the frequency of trade, and possibly on some
aspects of the institutional environment.
Organizational form is often modeled as a discrete variable—“make,” “buy,”
or “hybrid,” for example—though it can sometimes be represented by a con-
tinuous variable. Of the independent variables, asset specificity has received
the most attention, presumably because of the central role it plays in the
transaction cost approach to vertical integration. Williamson (1991a) distin-
guishes among six types of asset specificity. The first is site specificity, in
which parties are in a “cheek-by-jowl” relationship to reduce transportation
and inventory costs and assets are highly immobile. The second, physical as-
set specificity, refers to relationship-specific equipment and machinery. The
third is human asset specificity, describing transaction-specific knowledge or
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human capital, achieved through specialized training or learning-by-doing. The
fourth is brand-name capital, reflected in intangible assets reflected in consumer
perceptions. The fifth is “dedicated assets,” referring to substantial, general-
purpose investments that would not have been made outside a particular trans-
action, the commitment of which is necessary to serve a large customer. The
sixth is temporal specificity, describing assets that must be used in a particular
sequence.
Data and Methods
Among the common empirical proxies for asset specificity are technical spec-
ifications like product complexity, qualitatively coded from survey data or
quantitatively assigned by inspection, as a proxy for physical asset specificity
(Masten, 1984; Bigelow, 2001); worker-specific knowledge, again coded from
survey data, as a proxy for human asset specificity (Monteverde and Teece,
1982a, 1982b; Masters and Miles, 2002); physical proximity of contracting
firms, as a proxy for site specificity (Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1988b, 1990; Spiller,
1985; Gonza´lez,-Diaz, Arrun˜ada, and Ferna´ndez, 2000); and spatial and tempo-
ral proximity (Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1991; Pirrong, 1993; Hubbard,
1999). Other proxies, such as fixed costs or “capital intensity,” have more
obvious limitations and are rarely used. Where asset specificity cannot be
easily measured, concentration has been used in single-industry studies to cap-
ture situations where small-numbers bargaining situations are likely to appear
(Ohanian, 1994). Common proxies for uncertainty include sales variance (Levy,
1985; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984) and some measure of technological un-
certainty, such as the frequency of changes in product specification and the prob-
ability of technological change (Walker and Weber, 1984; Crocker and Reynolds,
1993).
The empirical literature includes qualitative case studies, quantitative case
studies focusing on a single firm or industry, and econometric analysis of
cross-sectional or panel data from multiple firms or industries. Williamson’s
(1976) study of cable TV franchising in Oakland, California and Coase’s (2000)
reinterpretation of the G.M.–Fisher Body case are examples of the first cate-
gory, while Masten’s (1984) investigation of contracting practices in a large
aerospace corporation and Saussier’s (2000) study of electricity contracts are
examples of the second.5 Cross-industry analyses include Levy’s (1985) study
of manufacturing and John and Weitz’s (1988) paper on forward integration into
distribution.
5 Other case studies on vertical integration include Stuckey (1983) on the aluminum industry, Palay
(1984) on rail shipping, Gallick (1984) on tuna processing, Joskow (1985) on coal-burning electric plants,
Goldberg and Erickson (1987) on petroleum coke, Masten and Snyder (1993) on shoes, Pirrong (1993)
on ocean shipping, Ohanian (1994) on pulp and paper, Me´nard (1996) on poultry, and Martinez (2002) on
poultry, egg, and pork.
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Case studies comprise the bulk of the studies on the make-or-buy decision,
primarily because the main variables of interest—asset specificity, uncertainty,
frequency—are difficult to measure consistently across firms and industries. In
many of the early studies these characteristics were estimated based on sur-
veys or interviews: for example, a manager might be asked to rate the de-
gree to which an investment has value in outside uses, on a Likert-type 1 to
7 scale. Such data are of course subject to the general limits of survey data;
namely, that they are based on the respondents’ stated beliefs, rather than on
their beliefs or valuations as revealed through choice. More important, since
these measurements are based on ordinal rankings, it is hard to compare them
from industry to industry. What is ranked as a relatively specialized asset in
one firm may be rated differently in another firm or industry. Similarly, what
one firm considers a comparatively uncertain production process may be the
standard operating environment in another. Multi-industry studies may there-
fore contain variables that are labeled the same thing but are really incom-
mensurable, or, conversely, may contain variables that are identical but labeled
differently.
While avoiding the problem of inconsistent measurement across industries,
case studies have their own problems. The classification of discrete variables like
“make-or-buy,” for example, may require more discretion by the researcher than
economists are comfortable with. And, of course, the evidence from individual
cases may not apply to other cases. Still, the cumulative evidence from different
studies and industries is remarkably consistent with the basic transaction cost
argument, though naturally there remain outstanding puzzles, challenges, and
controversies.6
Are All Organizations “Efficient”?
A more general problem with the empirical literature on vertical integration—
or, for that matter, any aspect of organizational form—is that we usually
observe only the business arrangements actually chosen. If these arrange-
ments are presumed to be efficient, then we can draw inferences about
the appropriate alignment between transactional characteristics and organi-
zational form simply by observing what firms do. Indeed, the early empir-
ical work on the transaction cost approach implicitly assumed that market
forces work to cause an “efficient sort” between transactions and governance
structures. Williamson (1988, p. 174) acknowledges this assumption, while
recognizing that the process of transaction cost economizing is not auto-
matic:
6 Moreover, a case study is often better than the alternative: no study. In Simon’s (1992, p. 1504)
words, “Although case studies are only samples of one, such samples are infinitely more informative than
samples of none. . . [V]alid hypotheses are much more likely to emerge from direct, intimate encounter
with organizations than from speculation.”
The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies 441
The [transaction cost] argument relies in a general, background way on the efficacy
of competition to perform a sort between more and less efficient modes and to shift
resources in favor of the former. This seems plausible, especially if the relevant
outcomes are those that appear over intervals of five and ten years rather than in the
very near term. This intuition would nevertheless benefit from a more fully devel-
oped theory of the selection process. Transaction cost arguments are thus open to
some of the same objections that evolutionary economists have made of orthodoxy.
Still, he maintains that the efficiency presumption is reasonable, offering the
argument—analogous to Friedman’s famous (1953) statement on the selection
process—that inefficient governance arrangements will tend to be discovered
and undone. Concerning vertical integration, for example, Williamson (1985,
pp. 119–20) writes that “backward integration that lacks a transaction cost ra-
tionale or serves no strategic purposes will presumably be recognized and will
be undone,” adding that mistakes will be corrected more quickly “if the firm is
confronted with an active rivalry.”
Recently, researchers have begun to examine this conjecture more closely,
looking to see if appropriately organized firms—that is, firms that match transac-
tional characteristics to governance structures as the theory says they should—
really do outperform the feasible alternatives. Several papers use a two-step
procedure in which organizational form (in particular, the relationship between
transactional characteristics and governance structure) is endogenously cho-
sen in the first stage, then used to explain performance in the second stage.
By endogenizing both organizational form and performance this approach also
mitigates the selection bias associated with OLS regressions of performance on
firm characteristics.7
One important performance measure, in light of Williamson’s conjecture
regarding the selection process, is firm survival. Silverman, Nickerson and
Freeman (1997), for example, show that transaction cost efficiency is positively
correlated with firm survival in the for-hire trucking industry, while Bigelow
(2001) examines outsourcing arrangements in the U.S. automobile industry and
finds that transactions that are appropriately aligned tend to last longer than
inappropriately organized ones.
This evolutionary approach sheds considerable light on the processes by
which organizations adapt and change, along with the costs of misalignment or
maladaptation. However, reliance on evolutionary models introduces additional
problems. In many cases, survival may not be the best measure of performance,
compared with profitability or market value. Poorly performing firms may sur-
vive due to inefficient competitors, regulatory protection, or legal barriers to exit
such anti-takeover amendments or an overprotective bankruptcy code. In short,
efficient alignment between transactions and governance should be expected
7 Papers using a two-stage approach (such as Heckman’s selection model) in this fashion include Masten,
Meehan, and Snyder (1991), Poppo and Zenger (1998), Saussier (2000), Nickerson, Hamilton, and Wada
(2001), Sampson (2001), Macher (2001), and Yvrande-Billon (2004).
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only if the selection environment is strong. Moreover, when market conditions
change rapidly and unexpectedly, ex post survival may not be a good measure
of ex ante efficiency; a particular organizational form may be right for the times,
but the times change. Indeed, the optimal organizational forms may be those
that adapt most readily to new circumstances (Boger, Hobbs, and Kerr, 2001).8
4. EVIDENCE ON THE MAKE-OR-BUY DECISION: A SAMPLER
Component Procurement
The decision to make components internally or procure them on the open market
was the first topic studied extensively within the transaction cost framework.
Early efforts by Monteverde and Teece (1982b) and Masten (1984) use sam-
ples of components, coded as either made or bought, along with proxies for
asset specificity such as worker-specific knowledge and component complex-
ity as rated by industrial engineers. Each paper uses a probit model to test the
relationship between in-house production and asset specificity, along with un-
certainty and other control variables, and each finds that asset specificity is a
statistically significant predictor of vertical integration.
Refinements to this basic approach include distinguishing among types of un-
certainty and among types of asset specificity. Walker and Weber (1984) study
automobile component procurement and find that uncertainty about production
volume raises the probability that a component is made in-house, but “techno-
logical uncertainty,” measured as the frequency of changes in product specifica-
tion and the probability of technological improvements, has little effect. Masten,
Meehan, and Snyder (1989) compare relative importance of relationship-specific
human and physical capital. Also studying automobile production, they find that
engineering effort, as a proxy for human asset specificity, appears to affect the
integration decision more than physical or site specificity. Klein (1988), in a
discussion of the G.M.–Fisher Body case, also suggests that specific human
capital in the form of technical knowledge was a major determinant of G.M.’s
decision to buy out Fisher.
Indeed, the relationship between G.M. and Fisher Body in the 1920s is the
most commonly cited example of a holdup problem solved by vertical integra-
tion. Both Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1985, pp. 114–
15) explain G.M.’s buyout of Fisher in terms of the specific physical assets that
accompanied the switch from wooden- to metal-bodied cars. The account
in Klein (1988) is somewhat different, emphasizing specific human capital.
Langlois and Robertson (1989) also criticize the earlier account of the G.M.–
Fisher relationship, arguing that systemic uncertainty, rather than asset speci-
ficity, was the motive for vertical integration. Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel
8 An emerging literature on firms as experiments makes the case that organizational change—even the
reversal or “undoing” of previous actions—can be consistent with efficient behavior (Mosakowski, 1997;
Boot, Milbourn, and Thakor, 1999; Matsusaka, 2001; Klein and Klein, 2002).
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(2000) suggest that vertical integration promoted collaborative learning, while
Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber (2000) argue it improved the coordination of
production and inventories. Interestingly, as Gibbons (2000) points out, few
studies investigate the relationship between Fisher and G.M. after the acquisi-
tion. An exception is Freeland (2000), who maintains that the Fisher brothers
successfully held up G.M. after they became employees. (See below for more
on the continuing controversy over this case.)
Other papers document a similar link between integration and R&D, which
usually involves specific human capital (Armour and Teece, 1980; Joskow,
1985; Pisano, 1990). Asset specificity is associated with tighter vertical co-
ordination in many industries, including electricity generation (Joskow, 1985;
Saussier, 2000), aerospace (Masten, 1984), aluminum (Stuckey, 1983; Hennart,
1988), forestry (Globerman and Schindt, 1986), chemicals (Lieberman, 1991),
engineering (Lyons, 1995), trucking (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003), offshore
oil gathering (Hallwood, 1991), information technology (Ulset, 1996), elec-
tronic components (Weiss and Kurland, 1997), construction (Gonza´lez-Diaz,
Arrun˜ada, and Ferna´ndez, 2000), and even stock exchanges (Bindseil, 1997).
Many of these studies include controls for other possible determinants of
vertical structure such as market structure, scale and scope economies, and
other industry characteristics, and the impact of asset specificity usually remains
statistically (and economically) significant. As discussed above, the latest papers
also try to minimize selection bias and the effects of unobserved heterogeneity
though improved econometric procedures.
Nearly all the studies cited above are focused, single-industry case stud-
ies. A few studies have used cross-sectional or panel data to estimate the ef-
fects of transactional characteristics on vertical integration using multi-industry
data. An early effort by Levy (1985) uses the ratio of value-added to sales
as a cross-industry measure of vertical integration9; the number of firms and
amount of R&D spending as measures of asset specificity; and the variance of
sales as a measure of uncertainty. Using data from 69 firms representing 37
industries, he finds each of the independent variables to have a statistically sig-
nificant effect on the likelihood of vertical integration. Macmillan, Hambrick,
and Pennings (1986) obtain very similar results with a larger sample. Har-
rigan (1986), by contrast, finds sales variability to result in a lower chance
of vertical integration, although she does not include a measure for asset
specificity.
Accounting constructs like the ratio of value-added to sales, however, are
problematic as measures of vertical integration. Value-added figures are re-
ported inconsistently across firms and industries, and there are several accepted
methods for computing value-added ratios.10 Caves and Bradburd (1988) con-
struct a more complicated cross-industry measure of integration based on an
9 A fully vertical integrated firm will have a value-added-to-sales ratio of one, while a firm that procures
components externally will have a smaller ratio.
10 See the discussion in Bender (2002).
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input–output matrix of distribution shipments across several industries. They
use this metric to compare asset specificity, small-numbers bargaining condi-
tions, and risk as determinants of vertical integration. They find asset specificity
and small-numbers situations, but not risk, to be significant. Hypotheses based
on contractual hazards thus do well in their study as compared to competing ap-
proaches. Unfortunately, their procedures are exceptionally data-intensive and
may not be feasible in many cases. Other potentially fruitful approaches use
financial data on merging firms’ pre- and post-merger performance, either to
study the gains from merger as a function of asset specificity (Spiller, 1985)
or to examine the likelihood of merger as a function of pre-merger bilateral
relationships (Weiss, 1992).
A problem with these cross-sectional studies is that they cannot control for
time and for unobserved firm-specific characteristics. Using panel data can over-
come this limitation. Gonza´lez-Diaz, Arrun˜ada, and Ferna´ndez (2000) assemble
a panel of Spanish construction firms over a six-year period and study the use
of independent subcontractors. They regress the percentage of subcontracting
on a distance-based measure of asset specificity, a measure of uncertainty, time-
and firm-fixed effects, and other control variables. They find that asset speci-
ficity, but not uncertainty, explains most of the outsourcing decision, even when
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Other studies using panel data, such
as Ohanian’s (1994) investigation of vertical integration in the U.S. pulp and
paper industry and Lafontaine and Shaw’s (1999) study of franchise contracting,
also support transaction cost explanations even when fixed effects are included.
These studies suggest that the generally recognized relationship between asset
specificity and vertical control is probably not driven by unobservable firm-
specific factors.
Forward Integration into Marketing and Distribution
While economists typically think of vertical integration as backward integra-
tion into components, materials or R&D, forward integration into marketing
and distribution may be just as important. As Anderson and Gatignon discuss
in their chapter in this volume, several studies of integration of marketing chan-
nels have used transaction cost reasoning. Anderson and Schmittlein (1984)
consider two marketing alternatives for an electronics component producer: the
use of employees as a direct sales force (a form of vertical integration), or re-
liance on independent manufacturers’ representatives. This choice is regressed
on managers’ perceptions of the importance of specific human capital, sales
volume uncertainty, and measurement uncertainty (all based on survey data),
each of which is predicted to increase the likelihood of a direct sales force.
Both specific human capital and measurement uncertainty are statistically sig-
nificant, though sales uncertainty is not. Another study by Anderson (1985),
also on the electronics industry, finds the same basic results, as does work by
John and Weitz (1988) using data from a variety of industrial-product indus-
tries. Regan (1997) looks at the insurance business and finds that independent
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sales agencies are more common when relationship-specific investment data
processing and communications systems are less important. Fein and Anderson
(1997) use transaction cost reasoning to show that geographic and brand re-
strictions serve to protect manufacturers’ and distributors’ specific reputational
capital.
As Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1994) point out, however, the evidence from
many of these studies is consistent not only with the transaction cost model,
but also with a multitask principal–agent model in which certain clusters of
attributes (here, high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and
worker freedom from direct controls) go together. Still, the fact that the evi-
dence in marketing and distribution is so similar to the evidence from backward
integration into manufacturing and supplies suggests that the transaction cost
interpretation should not be easily dismissed.
Marketing and distribution depend on other factors as well, of course. Muris,
Scheffman, and Spiller’s (1992) study of the carbonated beverage industry finds
that the shift from independent bottlers to captive subsidiaries during the late
twentieth century can be explained without reference to changes in physical
asset specificity or site specificity. Instead, they account for the shift in terms of
the emergence of national cola markets, which required greater coordination of
advertising and promotional activities. Along with changing technologies in cola
production and distribution (namely, falling transportation and communication
costs), it was this need for more centralized decision-making—for given levels
of asset specificity—that explains the change toward a more vertically integrated
industry.
Contracts and Contractual Design
The earliest literature on the make-or-buy decision—starting with Coase
(1937)—treated external sourcing and in-house procurement as polar opposites.
Firms were modeled as choosing, as expressed by the title of Williamson’s in-
fluential (1975) book, between “markets and hierarchies.” And yet, we observe
firms choosing a variety of intermediate or hybrid forms of organization, such
as long-term contracts, partial ownership agreements, franchises, networks, al-
liances, and other combinations. A good theory of the make-or-buy decision
must also explain under what circumstances firms choose one of these interme-
diate forms.
In the transaction cost approach, a hybrid such as a long-term contract repre-
sents a blend, or compromise, between the benefits of centralized coordination
and control and the incentive and informational advantages of decentralized
decision-making (Williamson, 1991a; Me´nard, 2004). For certain types of trans-
actions an intermediate form of governance is appropriate. For instance, under
conditions of asset specificity but negligible uncertainty, long-term contracts
may be an effective means of mitigating opportunism. When asset specificity
and uncertainty are both high, however, contracts may be insufficiently flexible,
leading to vertical integration instead.
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Some key issues related to the choice between market, hierarchy, and con-
tracts (or other hybrids) are presented below. For a more detailed treatment of
the relevant econometric issues see Saussier’s chapter in this volume.
Why Contract?
Surprisingly, while there is an extensive empirical literature explaining contrac-
tual form—duration, completeness, complexity, and other attributes—in terms
of transaction costs (see Saussier, this volume, for a survey), the choice between
contract and vertical integration or spot-market procurement has received less
attention. An exception is the continuing controversy surrounding the purchase
of Fisher Body by G.M. in 1926. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and
Klein (1988) cite the case as a classic example of vertical integration designed
to mitigate holdup in the presence of asset specificity. Fisher refused to locate
its plants near G.M. assembly plants and to change its production technology in
the face of an unanticipated increase in the demand for car bodies, leading G.M.
to terminate its existing ten-year supply contract with Fisher and acquire full
ownership. Coase (2000), revisiting the original documents, argues instead that
the contract performed well, and was gradually replaced with full ownership
only to get Fisher’s top managers (the Fisher brothers) more closely involved in
G.M.’s other operation.
Coase (2000) reveals that the original ten-year supply contract included pro-
visions that G.M. would acquire 60 percent of Fisher’s stock and that three of
the five members of Fisher’s finance committee would be appointed by G.M.
Moreover, in 1921 one of the Fisher brothers became a director of G.M., with
two other brothers joining him in 1924, one of whom became president of G.M.’s
Cadillac division. A fourth brother was added to the board in 1926 when G.M.
acquired the remainder of Fisher’s stock. As Coase points out, the interests of
the two companies were sufficiently aligned during the period covered by the
original contract that it is unlikely that Fisher would have used the contract to
extract rents from G.M. Also, contrary to the conventional understanding of the
case, Fisher did in fact build eight new body plants between 1922 and 1925
that were close to G.M. facilities and had incentives to use the most efficient
technology available. In short, G.M. did not acquire the remaining 40 percent of
Fisher’s stock in response to an inappropriate alignment between transactional
attributes and an existing governance structure. Rather, the long-term contract
signed in 1919 was adequate for mitigating holdup in the face of asset specificity
and uncertainty, and was replaced by vertical integration for secondary reasons.
A few papers study the choice between contracts and other hybrids such
as partial ownership agreements or “equity linkages” for conducting R&D.
Pisano (1990) argues that partial ownership dominates contracts under certain
combinations of asset specificity, uncertainty, the number of trading partners,
and other variables. Equity linkages are more likely when R&D is to be done
during collaboration and when collaboration encompasses multiple projects
and less likely when there are more potential collaborators. Oxley (1997, 1999)
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shows that the choice between contractual and equity-based vertical alliances is
largely explained by the costs of contracting.
Contractual Design
Given that contracts are used, what provisions should they contain, how long
and how complete should they be, and so on? An influential series of papers by
Joskow (1985, 1987, 1988b, 1990) focuses on duration and price-adjustment
provisions in agreements between coal suppliers and coal-burning electrical
plants. He examined a large sample of coal contracts and found that contracts
tended to be longer, all else equal, when relationship-specific investments (here,
site specificity and dedicated assets) are at stake. Crocker and Masten (1988)
find the same result for the natural gas industry. More generally, they argue that
efficient contract duration depends on the costs of contracting; contract terms
become shorter, for example, as uncertainty increases.11
Another important contractual dimension is incompleteness. As discussed
above, the transaction cost approach holds that all complex contracts are nec-
essarily incomplete; otherwise, why would specialized governance arrange-
ments be necessary? But the degree of incompleteness—for instance, the extent
to which renegotiation procedures are specified—is endogenous. Crocker and
Reynolds (1993) test the relationship between contractual incompleteness and
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior in a study of Air Force engine procure-
ment. Using a sample of procurement agreements from the 1970s and 1980s
they find that contracts are more complete when the contractor has a history of
disputes with purchasers and less complete when there are increases in associ-
ated intertemporal or technological uncertainty (increasing the cost of writing
more complete contracts).
As Saussier (2000) points out, however, both this study and Crocker and
Masten’s (1991) analysis of incompleteness in natural-gas contracting rely on
highly indirect measures of asset specificity. Saussier’s (2000) study of French
electricity contracts uses more direct measures for both physical asset specificity
and site specificity, based on interviews, and finds that these are positively
related to completeness, ceteris paribus. Saussier also attempts to endogenize
asset specificity by employing a two-stage estimation procedure in which asset
specificity is regressed on exogenous predictors in a first stage, and the fitted
values used in the second-stage regression of incompleteness on asset specificity.
(Correcting for endogeneity has little effect on the results).
Besides duration, price-adjustment provisions, and completeness, other con-
tractual practices such as “take-or-pay” and exclusive-dealing provisions have
been analyzed with transaction cost reasoning. An example is DeCanio and
Frech’s (1993) study of take-or-pay contracts in the natural gas industry. These
contracts, which require the buyer to pay for some minimum quantity even if
11 On natural gas contracts see also Crocker and Masten (1991), Hubbard and Weiner (1991), and Dahl
and Matson (1998).
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delivery is not taken, are used to safeguard against buyer (pipeline) opportunism.
In 1987, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) outlawed take-
or-pay contracts. The authors used data from before and after the FERC order
to test its effect on spot gas prices and prices at the wellhead. They found that
FERC’s interference with parties’ ability to craft long-term governance mech-
anisms raised natural gas prices between 21 percent and 31 percent in the year
following FERC’s order. The results support the theory that long-term contracts
add substantial value where asset specificity is high, while representing an effort
to quantify that efficiency gain.12
Exclusive dealing—long regarded by economists and antitrust authorities
as an anticompetitive practice—can also be explained using transaction cost
reasoning. Gallick’s (1984) study of the U.S. tuna industry argues that exclusive
dealing is an efficient means of discouraging ex-post opportunism by fishing boat
captains. Because most tuna sold in the U.S. is canned, buying a boat’s output at a
price reflecting average quality is cheaper for tuna processors than paying for the
inspection, sorting, and grading usually found in fresh-fish markets. Exclusive
dealing arrangements prevent the boat captains from selling the higher-quality
tuna, ex post, to rival processors at higher prices. Exclusive dealing can enhance
the efficiency of trade in other settings as well (Heide, Dutta, and Bergen, 1998).
Other Hybrids
Other hybrid forms of organization include sharing arrangements such as fran-
chising or agricultural cropsharing; groups of firms organized as networks, clus-
ters, or alliances; and reciprocal investments or reciprocal-trading arrangements
(see Me´nard, 2004, for an overview of the literature on hybrids).13 Franchising
and cropsharing have each received substantial attention, both within the transac-
tion cost and agency literatures. Under franchising, the franchisor’s brand-name
capital is a valuable asset (though it may or may not be specific to particular
franchisees). Franchise contracts allow the franchisor to leverage this asset while
retaining the high-powered incentives the franchisee would lose under vertical
integration. An extensive empirical literature has tried to explain pricing ar-
rangements such as license fees and royalty rates (Lafontaine, 1992; Bercovitz,
1999), along with specific franchising provisions such as formal procedural
rules, standardization of inputs and outputs, and centralization of core functions
like training and information technology (Dnes, 1996; Lafontaine and Slade,
1997; Lafontaine and Raynaud, 2002), using transaction cost and agency the-
ory. Still, important puzzles remain; one is the coexistence of franchised and
company-owned stores within the same brand.14
12 Mulherin (1986) and Masten and Crocker (1985) also examine “take-or-pay” contracts.
13 A firm in which decision rights are highly decentralized, as described by Jensen and Meckling (1992),
may also be considered a hybrid.
14 On sharing arrangements in food and agriculture see Allen and Lueck (1993) and Arrun˜ada, Gonza´lez-
Diaz, and Lopez (1996). On hybrids in agriculture more generally see the discussion in Me´nard and Klein
(2004).
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Firms may also organize themselves into networks, groups that pool resources
but often rely on relational contracts, rather than formal written agreements, to
coordinate their behavior. Networks are particularly important in agriculture,
where an increasing emphasis on quality control necessitates tight coordination
among members of the vertical production process (Me´nard, 1996). Formal ties
can also help firms realize the agglomeration economies that result from knowl-
edge and other geographic spillovers (Porter, 2000). Transaction cost reasoning
helps explain the observed variety of network structures (Me´nard, 1996) as well
as the specific contractual arrangements used by network (or formal alliance)
partners to protect specific investments (Oxley, 1997). Still, we know relatively
little about the efficiency of networks and alliances relative to integrated firms
and the rules network members use to govern the returns to shared resources.
Another important question is whether networks are a stable mode of organi-
zation, or a transitional form, eventually giving way to more consolidated (or
fragmented) structures (Me´nard and Klein, 2004).
Another way for parties to protect their relationship-specific investments
is by making other, “offsetting” investments. Heide and John (1988) provide
an example from marketing. To service a particular manufacturer, sales agen-
cies typically make investments specific to that manufacturer—most often, a
human-capital investment in developing a sales territory for the manufacturer’s
product. Because agencies are small compared with manufacturers, they can-
not safeguard their investments by backwards integration into manufacturing.
Similarly, they lack the bargaining power to demand long-term contracts with
manufacturers. Instead, they protect their relationship-specific assets by making
other specific investments, namely in routines or procedures that tie or “bond”
them with a manufacturer’s customers. These might involve establishing per-
sonal relationships with the customers, developing an identity separate from
the manufacturer’s particular product, or creating specialized procedures for
ordering, shipping, and servicing the product. In this way they “balance their
dependence” on the manufacturer with the customers’ dependence on them.15
Informal Agreements
As mentioned above, contractual relations need not be fully formal and explicit;
trading arrangements are often governed by less formal, relational norms. Palay
(1984, 1985) studies the role of informal, legally unenforceable agreements be-
tween rail-freight carriers and shippers. Shipment of items like automobile parts
and chemicals, for example, requires specially designed rail cars and equipment
that cannot be easily redeployed for other uses. Because vertical integration
was prohibited by regulation, informal agreements emerged to protect these
relationship-specific investments. Wilson (1980) shows how the New England
fresh-fish market works through mutual dependence created by the particular
trade arrangements there, governed by reputation. Acheson’s (1985) study of
15
“Countertrade” agreements appear to perform a similar function (Hennart, 1989).
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the Maine lobster market reaches similar conclusions, finding the lobster market
to be characterized by long-term, informal relationships between fishermen and
lobster-pound operators.16
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2001) show, more generally, how relational
contracting—both between and within firms—differs from formal contracting.
Relational contracts have the advantage that outcomes need not be verifiable to
third parties, such as courts, to limit parties’ incentives to behave opportunis-
tically. On the other hand, the absence of third-party participation means that
such agreements must be self-enforcing.17 Heide and John’s (1992) study of
buyer–supplier relations finds that relational norms often substitute for vertical
integration as a means of protecting specific assets; Anderson and Weitz (1992)
and Brown, Dev, and Lee (2000) show that such norms are also important in
marketing.
Other Examples
Other examples of vertical relations studied within the transaction cost frame-
work include tie-ins and “block booking” (Kenney and Klein, 1983), multina-
tional corporations (Hennart, 1989; Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1987b; Gatignon
and Anderson, 1988; Klein, Frazer, and Roth, 1990; Hu and Chen, 1993; Henisz,
2000), company towns and company stores (Fishback, 1986, 1992), the rise of
medieval marketplaces and towns (Bindseil and Pfeil, 1999), and even mar-
riage (Hamilton, 1999). These and other “non-standard” contracting practices,
when viewed through a transaction cost lens, often turn out to have efficiency
properties, particularly in offering safeguards for specific investments.
5. CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The vast empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision, including the struc-
ture of long-term contracts and hybrid forms of organization, is largely con-
sistent with the transaction cost theory of the firm: vertical arrangements are
usually best understood as attempts to protect trading partners from the hazards
of exchange under incomplete contracting. As Joskow (1991, p. 47) observes,
the literature on the make-or-buy decision is in many ways in “much better
shape than much of the empirical work in industrial organization generally.”18
However, important challenges, puzzles, and opportunities remain. First, the
16 Informal agreements and norms in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century whaling have been studied
similarly by Ellickson (1989) and Gifford (1993).
17 Self-enforcing agreements can be interpreted as noncooperative Nash equilibria in a set of repeated
games; such agreements have been called “norms” (Ullman-Margalit, 1977), “conventions” (Sugden,
1986), and “social institutions” (Schotter, 1981). Ellickson’s (1991) study of relationships between cattle
ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California shows that social norms (what he calls “customary law”)
can be superior to administrative or judicial dispute resolution among people with close social ties.
18 Williamson (1996a, p. 55) puts it bluntly: “Transaction cost economics is an empirical success story.”
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measurement and definition of asset specificity, uncertainty, and other variables
remains inconsistent. Second, many studies do not explicitly compare rival ex-
planations for vertical relationships. Third, correlation between transactional
attributes and governance structures is often mistaken for causality. Fourth, the
legal and regulatory environments do not always get sufficient attention.
Measurement and Definition
As mentioned above, empirical research on make-or-buy decisions is often ham-
pered by confusion about the definitions of, and therefore the empirical proxies
for, key variables such as asset specificity and uncertainty. Asset specificity is
difficult to measure consistently across industries, partially explaining why there
are far more single-industry studies of vertical boundaries than cross-industry
studies. Uncertainty is hard to define, let alone measure.19 Moreover, empirical
studies sometimes treat uncertainty as an independent variable, regressing the
choice of organizational form on the variance of sales or another variable, but
without including any measure of asset specificity in the model. Absent fixed
investments, however, transaction cost economics does not predict that uncer-
tainty would itself lead to hierarchical governance. Changes in circumstances
only allow for expropriation where there are quasi-rents at risk; that is, where
one side’s investment is exposed. Where there are no relationship-specific in-
vestments at stake, it may be less costly for a firm to contract on the market
for goods and services in an uncertain environment than to assume the risk of
producing them internally. In this way, the effect of uncertainty depends on
competitive conditions. If there is no asset specificity and thus there are many
potential suppliers of a component for which future demand is uncertain, it may
be cheaper to buy the component than to make it internally.20
Asset specificity has been more successfully treated in the empirical literature;
relationship-specific physical, site and human capital investments have all been
studied, both independently and comparatively. However, further refinement and
analysis needs to be done here, particularly concerning measurement. Proxies
such as capital intensity or fixed costs are very imperfect and may not capture
19 As discussed above, the empirical literature on vertical integration tends to use fairly crude measures of
uncertainty (such as the variation of sales). Distinctions between systemic and idiosyncratic risk, between
demand and supply (or technological) risk, and between risk and Knightian uncertainty have rarely been
addressed.
20 In some situations uncertainty is so great that efficient governance structures cannot be crafted at all,
in which case trade may fail to materialize. While there is a considerable stream of theoretical literature,
following Akerlof (1970), on the possibility that markets might break down due to private information,
there is relatively little theoretical or empirical work on non-market exchange under these conditions. An
exception is Wiggins and Libecap’s (1985) study of unitization agreements in oil production. Under such
an agreement producers designate a single firm to develop a given field, with the net returns shared among
all producers. This reduces recovery costs and improves oil yields by eliminating the negative externalities
associated with concurrent independent development of a single field. Yet very few oil fields are unitized.
Wiggins and Libecap argue that asymmetric information encourages opportunistic holdout strategies that
have usually prevented the agreements from being signed.
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whether the investment has value outside the transaction for which it was initially
made.21 Another concern is that asset-specificity effects may be confused with
market power. While specific investment may lead to bilateral monopoly, a
small-numbers bargaining situation is not by itself evidence of relationship-
specific investment.
The Role of Asset Specificity
While the early transaction cost literature emphasized asset specificity as the key
to an efficiency explanation for vertical integration, several studies use trans-
action cost and incomplete-contracting theory to explain vertical integration in
the absence of asset specificity. Pirrong (1993) argues that long-term contracts
(and sometimes vertical integration) can be efficient in the presence of smaller
contracting hazards—even when physical, human, and site asset specificities
are absent. In a study of bulk shipping, he finds that more integrated governance
structures can dominate spot trading in the presence of what Masten, Meehan,
and Snyder (1991) call “temporal specificities.” When a processing or refinery
plant contracts with a particular bulk carrier, for example, both plant and carrier
capacities suddenly become specific assets. Small delays in delivery can then
result in large losses of quasi-rents for the plant, just as the plant’s refusal to
take full delivery can impose substantial losses on the carrier. To avoid costly
strategic bargaining, then, these parties will choose a complex, long-term agree-
ment. Martinez (2002) shows how temporal specificities lead to tight vertical
coordination in poultry and egg production.
Three recent studies of the U.S. trucking market also find long-term con-
tracts in the absence of asset specificity. Both Williamson (1985, p. 54) and
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978, p. 244) cite trucks as clear examples
of durable, but nonspecific, assets. Yet, as shown by Hubbard (1999) and
Nickerson and Silverman (2003), trucking continues to be characterized by
tight vertical coordination between hired drivers and shippers, rather than
market-based coordination between independent owner-operators and ship-
pers, even after the industry was deregulated in the 1970s. Hubbard (1999)
uses this evidence to challenge the scope of holdup theories more generally.
Nickerson and Silverman (2003) show that the need for temporal coordina-
tion among hauls, and the shipper’s desire to protect its brand-name capi-
tal, leads to tight vertical control, explaining why many shippers continue to
use company-owned trucks. Lafontaine and Masten (2002) argue that the ob-
served variation in contractual arrangements in trucking can best be explained
by driver and truck heterogeneity, not asset specificity or marginal incentive
considerations.
None of these studies denies that physical asset specificity and site specificity
are important determinants of vertical relations, only that some cases of vertical
21 The same applies to measures of human asset specificity, such as training, used to explain labor
outsourcing (see, for example, Masters and Miles, 2002).
The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies 453
control can be explained without reference to them, or to holdup problems at
all. At present, these results appear as exceptions to a more general rule. Still, an
accumulation of such anomalies could challenge the key underlying structure
of the transaction cost approach.
Comparing Rival Explanations
Besides these difficulties of measurement and definition, and the role of key
independent variables, empirical research on vertical boundaries is also subject
to the problem found in empirical work generally: alternate hypotheses that
could also fit the data are rarely stated and compared. Usually, the data are
found only consistent or inconsistent with the hypothesis at hand. Undoubtedly,
studies that explicitly compare competing, observationally distinct hypotheses
about contractual relationships are needed, because rival theories commonly
posit mutually exclusive outcomes.
One example is Spiller’s (1985) comparison of asset-specificity and market-
power explanations for vertical mergers, explanations that have rival predictions
about the size of the gains from mergers under various competitive conditions.
While transaction cost theory predicts that the gains from merger should be in-
creasing in the degree of asset specificity, market-power considerations suggest
that the gains will be increasing in the degree of supplier-market concentration.
Using site specificity, defined as the proximity of the merging firms, to represent
asset specificity, Spiller studies the gains from merger according to unexpected
changes in the firms’ stock prices at the announcement of the merger. He finds
the total gain from merger to be smaller where the distance between the merging
firms is greater (i.e., where site specificity is lower). He also finds no significant
relationship between industry concentration and the distance between merging
firms. These findings appear to support the asset-specificity explanation over
the market-power explanation.
Poppo and Zenger’s (1995) investigation of transaction cost and resourced-
based explanations for information-technology (IT) outsourcing represents an-
other comparative study. They use a survey of corporate IT managers to measure
perceived satisfaction with both outsourced and in-house IT services. Consis-
tent with transaction cost reasoning, they find that asset specificity is negatively
related to the performance of market transactions. Contrary to the resource-
based view (and specific predictions offered by Ghoshal and Moran, 1996, for
example), they find that asset specificity does not improve the performance of
in-house transactions. (Some findings are consistent with both theories.) Other
studies that assess both transaction cost and rival theories include Poppo and
Zenger (1998), Silverman (1999), and Nickerson, Hamilton, and Wada (2001).
Most of these comparative studies appear in the strategic management literature,
where theories of the firm based on capabilities, power, and trust are important
rivals to the transaction cost view. In industrial organization, by contrast, theo-
ries of vertical boundaries built on market power or technological foundations
have not inspired much empirical research.
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Moreover, while the evidence presented in this chapter is often interpreted as
supportive of both (a) the transaction cost theory as explicated by Williamson
and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian and (b) the more formal version (the “prop-
erty rights approach”) associated with Grossman, Hart, and Moore, there are
important differences between these two sets of explanations for firm bound-
aries. (See Williamson, 2000, pp. 605–07 for a detailed discussion of these
differences.) For example, property-rights models focus exclusively on ex ante
underinvestment in relationship-specific human capital brought about by ineffi-
cient ownership arrangements, while transaction cost theories look more at the
ex post contract-execution stage. Partly because ex post contractual problems
are easier to observe than ex ante human capital underinvestment—How, for in-
stance, is optimal investment to be measured?—there have been relatively few
empirical studies explicitly in the property-rights tradition.22 Whinston (2000)
argues that the empirical evidence described above is not necessarily consistent
with the property-rights approach. As he points out, in property-rights models
the level of appropriable quasi-rents is not relevant for the integration decision;
only marginal quasi-rents matter. Few empirical studies make this distinction.
Furthermore, property-rights models offer specific predictions on the direction
of integration (whether buyer acquires seller or seller acquires buyer), a distinc-
tion that is also generally ignored in the empirical literature.
Causality
A more general concern is that most of the empirical studies discussed here
establish correlations, not causal relations, between asset specificity and inter-
nal governance. These studies typically test a reduced-form model where the
probability of observing a more hierarchical form of governance increases with
the degree of relationship-specific investments. Plausibly, if the presence of
such investments reduces the costs of internal organization, then asset speci-
ficity could lead to integration, independent of the holdup problem or other
maladaptation costs (Masten, 1994, p. 10). Masten, Meehan and Snyder (1991)
attempt to distinguish these two effects in the context of human capital. They
find that specific human capital investments appear to reduce internal gover-
nance costs more than they increase market governance costs. Further stud-
ies of this type would be valuable in assessing the implications of the evi-
dence for the reduced-form version of the basic theory. However, we do not
yet have a general theory of how relationship-specific assets might reduce
the costs of internal organization. By contrast, the underinvestment problem
associated with specific assets and market governance is fairly well under-
stood.
22 Hart (1995, p. 49) remarks that there has been “no formal testing of the property rights approach.”
(By “formal testing” he presumably excludes case studies.)
The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies 455
The Regulatory and Legal Environment
Contracting takes place “in the shadow of the law” (Cooter, Marks and Mnookin,
1982), and the empirical work on vertical boundaries could be improved by
greater attention to the effects of the regulatory and legal environments. With
notable exceptions (like the work on contracting among public utilities and
their suppliers), the literature has generally focused on relatively unregulated
industries operating under a relatively stable legal regime. However, differences
in regulatory structures, or how judges interpret contractual clauses, can have
substantial effects on the performance of alternative vertical arrangements. Ne-
glecting such differences leads to biased estimates of the effects of other factors,
such as asset specificity and uncertainty, on the decision to vertically integrate
or to use long-term contracts.
Recent papers by Henisz (2000), Delios and Henisz (2000), and Henisz and
Zelner (2001) have begun looking more closely at the relationship between
contractual hazards and political hazards. Henisz’s (2000) study of foreign in-
vestment finds that firms tend to prefer joint ventures with foreign partners
rather than majority owned plants where political hazards are high, even though
majority ownership may better mitigate the contractual hazards associated with
asset specificity. The available contracting options may also be limited by reg-
ulation. Moreover, as discussed above, Palay (1984, 1985) shows that informal
agreements can substitute for regulation when vertical integration is prohibited.
Loredo and Sua´rez (2000) study the coal-burning electricity plants in Spain and
find that the opportunism was mitigated by the regulatory compact between firms
and the state, instead of the long-term contracts used by U.S. plants. Me´nard and
Klein (2004) compare vertical relations in U.S. and European agriculture and
suggest that the variation is partly explained by differences in the institutional
environment.
The evolution of contractual relations in rapidly changing environments, such
as transition economies, is another important area (see Boger, Hobbs, and Kerr,
2001, for one example). These settings not only allow for comparative analysis,
but also provide insight into the ability of various contractual arrangements to
adapt to changing circumstances.
6. CONCLUSION
Despite the ongoing challenges described above, the transaction cost theory
of the firm has had remarkable success in explaining the vertical structure of
the enterprise. Indeed, the empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision is
generally considered one of the best-developed parts of the new institutional
economics. The recent survey by Boerner and Macher (2002) estimates the
number of empirical papers in transaction cost economics at over 600, and a
large share of these focus on vertical integration. As Williamson (2000, p. 607)
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remarks, “Those who have done this modest, slow, molecular, definitive work
deserve enormous credit.”
What lessons have we learned from this literature? First, asset specificity
is an important determinant of vertical contractual relations. It is not the sole
determinant, however; even in the face of uncertainty, arms-length contracting
may effectively protect parties’ relationship-specific investments. Tight vertical
coordination or control may also generate efficiencies unrelated to the protection
of specific assets.
Indeed, paradigmatic cases like the acquisition of Fisher Body by G.M. con-
tinue to generate controversy about the role of asset specificity compared to
other contractual or organizational considerations. Still, the transaction cost ap-
proach remains the dominant framework within which such debates take place.
No rival theory has produced a body of evidence remotely rivaling the transac-
tion cost explanation for vertical integration. Market power theories continue
to be relevant, particularly in the antitrust literature, but are substantially less
influential today than two or three decades ago. The resource-based or capabil-
ities view of firm boundaries is important, perhaps even dominant, within the
strategic-management literature, but it has not generated a substantial body of
empirical work. This is not to deny that some of the evidence usually taken
to support the transaction cost approach may also be consistent with these or
other alternative approaches. Indeed, as discussed above, relatively few studies
attempt to distinguish among rival explanations. Much more comparative work
is needed to address this concern.
A related issue is that most new theoretical work in economics on firm bound-
aries builds on the incomplete-contracting framework of Grossman, Hart, and
Moore, not the closely related—but not identical—transaction cost framework
of Williamson and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian. As explained above, the former
does not lend itself to empirical testing as easily as the latter. However, the formal
language in which the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory is expressed is more in tune
with contemporary economic theorizing than the mostly informal language of
the transaction cost approach. If the Grossman-Hart-Moore framework comes to
displace the transaction cost framework, the relevance of the empirical evidence
highlighted in this chapter may be called into question. On the other hand, the
difficulty in finding empirical support for incomplete-contracting models may
ultimately limit their popularity. Moreover, new formalizations of transaction
cost economics are beginning to emerge (for example, Bajari and Tadelis, 2001).
A second lesson is that vertical relations are often subtle and complex. While
early empirical work on transaction cost determinations of vertical integration
tended to focus on black-and-white distinctions between “make” or “buy,” re-
searchers increasingly recognize that a wide variety of contractual and organi-
zational options are available; there are many shades of gray. The literature on
hybrids has grown dramatically in the last ten years, while there are fewer studies
of mundane issues such as outsourcing versus in-house production per se.
Third, while we know much about the transaction cost determinants of ver-
tical relations, we know relatively little about the relation between the costs
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of contracting and organization and the wider legal, political, and social envi-
ronments. The progression from single-industry case studies to cross-industry,
within-country analyses, to cross-country investigations is a natural one (we see
it in empirical corporate finance, for example; see the chapter by Roe in this
volume). Comparisons of institutional arrangements across institutional envi-
ronments may become the next growth area in the transaction cost literature.
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